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Introduction 
 
In this paper I attempt to contribute to the debate concerning public safety and the 
regulation of risk by distinguishing five paradigm types of risky situation. The 
classification is derived analytically, developing work of Hélène Hermansson and 
Sven Ove Hansson.
1
 It is suggested that situations falling into some categories are 
inherently more troubling than those falling into others, and thus in greater need of 
regulation. However, where successful, regulation transforms a situation from 
belonging to one category to another, and in doing so reduces the ethical difficulties 
with the imposition of risk. In fact, it will be argued, many of the risks of ordinary life 
can be analysed as having been transformed in such a way. Unfortunately, however, 
the approach does not solve the most difficult cases; those often arising from 
significant technological developments, which pose unquantifiable but possibly 
catastrophic risks. 
 
Slam Door Carriages 
 
Before introducing the classification of cases, it will be helpful to start by considering 
some of the problems in the regulation of risk, and to do so I will begin with a case 
study: the phasing out of trains with slam door carriages, which is to say doors that 
could be opened from inside the train, at any time, by passengers. In the late 70’s I 
was for a while a daily commuter between Bromley South and Holborn Viaduct. As 
we approached the station we commuters would stand by each door, and while the 
train was still moving we would open the window, unlock the door from the outside 
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and hold tight until the train slowed to walking speed. Then we would let the door 
swing open and jump off the moving train, and thereby get to our desks around five 
seconds earlier than otherwise we would have done. 
 
Over time these carriages disappeared. Some carriages were modified so that the 
doors couldn’t be opened until the train had stopped, and others were replaced, 
although it wasn’t until a few years ago that the last were taken out of service. Many 
of these carriages were scrapped before the end of their planned life. The problem, of 
course, was that they had a poor safety record. Some people opened the doors when 
the train was traveling at high speed. As recently as 2002 the BBC reported that a 
student had died when falling from a train at 60mph in a tunnel.
2
 It appears that 
although the carriage had been modified so that the doors didn’t open, the windows 
still did, and somehow the student fell from the window. Slam door trains were 
associated with several deaths every year. Some commuters let the door open too 
early and fell. In other very unfortunate cases the door swung open and caught 
someone standing innocently on the platform. And it also appears that these carriages 
were far less able to withstand accidents than later designs. It was estimated that 
removing all slam door carriages would save between five and ten lives, and many 
injuries, a year. 
 
The question for the safety experts was whether slam door carriages should be 
replaced even if they had not reached the end of their normal operational life. Some 
people will argue that they are so dangerous that they should have been replaced as 
soon as alternatives became available. On this view there is an absolute duty of care 
to railway passengers. Others will argue that no decision can be made until we know 
what it costs to make the replacement. These calculations were done, and it was found 
that replacing the carriages would be a very significant expense, costing several 
million pounds for each life saved.
3
 Would this be money well spent? It is, of course, 
possible to adopt what became known as the Prescott principle. Immediately after the 
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Ladbroke Grove accident in 1999, at a time when it was thought that there were 
perhaps 70 dead (although it soon turned out that the actual number was 31 dead with 
over 500 injured) John Prescott is reported to have said to the BBC that cost would 
not be a consideration in implementing new safety systems, although he was not 
entirely clear about who should bear the cost.
4
  
 
Suppose phasing out slam door trains would save lives at the cost of £10 million for 
every life saved. Would this be money well spent? The economists’ view, in general, 
was that if you have £10million to spend, and you want to save some lives, you can 
do a lot better than spending it on railway safety to save one. For example, in road 
safety, the official policy is that if a safety improvement can be expected to save a 
life, and will cost £1.3-4 million or less it is worth introducing. In fact budgets are 
rather limited and it was reported to me by an official that the department of transport 
can rarely afford to spend more than a few hundred thousand pounds to make a safety 
improvement that could be expected to save a life. Consequently for £10million we 
could save perhaps thirty lives on the road, probably dozens through the health 
service and perhaps thousands through overseas aid. If you have £10million and want 
to save lives, just about the least efficient way of spending it is to improve railway 
safety. According to this way of looking at things, to understand whether or not to 
introduce a safety measure we must conduct a cost-benefit analysis, and in this case 
the benefits did not justify the costs. Nevertheless, the programme of early phasing 
out of slam door trains went ahead. 
 
 
Was that the wrong thing to do? The argument that it was a misuse of money can 
sound compelling. But imagine you are the economist advising the industry not to 
phase out slam door trains, because of the cost. The next day a child is killed by a 
door flying loose when the train comes into a station. The child’s distraught mother is 
interviewed on the BBC. She says ‘I just don’t understand it. We know that these 
carriages are unsafe. We could easily replace them. How many more children will 
have to die, before we do the right thing and get rid of these deathtraps?’ It seems to 
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me that even the best-trained economist might feel tempted to tear up the cost-benefit 
analysis and agree.  
 
What is so interesting here is that each of us seems likely to be gripped by two 
different patterns of moral reasoning that lead in a compelling way to conflicting 
conclusions. Cost-benefit analysis assumes a consequentialist moral framework in 
which there is a moral duty to achieve the greatest benefits within available resources, 
and appears to instruct us to divert money away from railway safety to other areas. On 
this view we are already spending far too much and should reduce the safety budget 
for the railways. This contrasts with a type of moral absolutism in which if we know 
how to prevent death we should do it without considering the cost. In the philosophy 
textbooks it is common to pose the tribe of consequentialists against the tribe of 
absolutists, but I think it is likely in this case that we all individually feel torn between 
the two standpoints. What should we do? I’ll come back to that question towards the 
end of this paper, which is not to say that I can resolve all important questions.  
 
So far we have looked only at one example, in which risk is a negative, to be avoided 
in order to improve safety. Yet it is clear that sometimes we seem to want to 
encourage risk. If business is risk averse then, we think, this is bad for economy and 
hence, ultimately, for all of us. If we are too worried about risk then our children will 
live dull, sedentary lives, and we ourselves may also cut ourselves off from 
challenging, exciting opportunities. Risk is a positive, both in that it can lead to 
individual and social reward and it can be exciting or invigorating in itself. Of course 
it can be taken to extremes. I had a friend who only got pleasure from gambling at 
horse races if he staked his train fare home. And of course he didn’t always win. But 
the main point is that situations differ, and what is true about one case, and the need to 
avoid risk, may not be true about another. Generalisation about the need to avoid risk, 
or the need to encourage it, are unhelpful. 
 
Classifying Cases 
 
It is important, then, to classify different cases. There are many ways in which this 
could be done but I want to take my lead from the observation made by two Swedish 
philosophers that generally there are three roles in any situation of risk. First, there is 
5 
the question of who bears the possible costs? Second, who reaps the possible 
benefits? And third, who decides whether the risk is taken?
5
 This is one of those 
insights that is so obvious, once you hear it, that you are sure that you must have had 
the thought yourself before. Only you probably have not. But whether or not the idea 
is familiar, it opens up the topic for us. 
 
The simplest situation is one in which one party occupies all three roles. Take, for 
example, the situation where you are offered medical advice. You are given the option 
of a medical procedure, which, if successful, will improve your quality of life. If it 
goes wrong then you will suffer, perhaps even die. So you, as an individual, will reap 
any benefits but also bear the costs, both of having the operation and of not having it. 
And it is your decision whether or not to go ahead. In this case, then, all three roles  - 
decision-maker, possible beneficiary, and possible loss-maker, are occupied by the 
same person. This type we can call ‘individualism’. 
 
Immediately, I am sure, it will be said that it is not as simple as this. The costs of one 
person’s death spreads to others, and, with luck, so do the benefits of their remaining 
alive. And, of course, whether the operation happens depends on whether a surgeon is 
prepared to perform it, and whether the regulators have given approval to that type of 
procedure. Indeed, in a sense the government is always at least a silent decision-
making partner; in the limit case deeming that this is the sort of situation that 
individuals can decide for themselves without supervision from government. 
 
In real life cases will be complex. I doubt that there will be any pure cases. But real 
life cases will resemble some pure cases more than they resemble others, and this will 
help us guide our ethical reflection about them. So there is reason, to begin with, to 
concentrate on pure cases; we will return to the complexities shortly. We have noted, 
then, that it is possible for all three roles to be occupied by one party. Consider now a 
different case, where the costs and benefits will fall on or accrue to one party, but 
another party makes a decision about whether the risk can be run, or at least the 
circumstances in which it can be run. Consider, for example, the case of whether 
motor-cycle helmets should be compulsory. Now it could easily be argued that how to 
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balance the enjoyment of wind through one’s hair against the cost of near certain 
death in a high-speed accident is entirely up to the individual and therefore this should 
be another case where the decision, benefits and costs should be concentrated in one 
individual. But this is not how governments now see it, of course, and they will not 
allow individuals to run this risk. Rather they require a certain level of safety that 
probably reduces the pleasure to a small degree but increases safety to what they hope 
will be a significant one. This makes the case, in part at least, one, where one party 
decides whether or not a risk is to be taken, but another party suffers the costs and 
receives the benefits. If the first case is a triumph of individualism, this one, obviously 
enough, is paternalism. 
 
Again, though, there are complications. First, the classification of the case as one 
where the costs fall only on the individual can be contested. Once we have a system 
of national health care then medical costs are spread out over the population as a 
whole, and so it is no longer true that anyone takes risks just for themselves. Note, 
though, that if this is intended as a reason for saying that costs to others justify 
intervention then in this case the argument backfires. In calculating the cost of 
accidents the department of transport has a category of ‘ambulance and medical costs’ 
which are less than £1,000 for a death and more than £13,000 for a serious injury. If it 
is NHS costs we are worried out it appears that we should discourage the use of 
motor-cycle helmets. But presumably this is not our primary concern. 
 
A quite different issue has been pointed out with great force by John Adams: the 
difficulty regulators may have in trying to improve individual safety in cases where 
individuals have a measure of freedom of action. People will adapt to a changing 
environment. For example, Adams has suggested that cyclists wearing helmets feel 
safer and will take more risks. If this is right you may be more likely to survive a 
cycle accident if you are wearing a helmet, but you are also more likely to be in an 
accident in the first place. Similarly, Adams has argued, we cannot tell whether 
banning motor cycles would reduce deaths. Everything depends on what the motor-
cyclists would do instead. If, he says, they spend their new free time taking tea with 
their grandmothers then indeed deaths would go down. But if they found other ways 
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of getting their adrenaline fix, who knows?
6
 But perhaps his most notorious 
observation is that if we are very concerned to make people drive more safely then we 
ought to stop making cars safer. Rather we should make them very dangerous. Instead 
of airbags, we should have spikes sticking out of the middle of the steering wheel.
7
 
The you’d drive carefully. 
 
More broadly, Adams has posited the theory of risk compensation – we are each 
comfortable with a certain level of risk, and as our environment becomes safer we 
become more adventurous in our behaviour. To illustrate, Adams uses the image of a 
‘risk thermostat’. There is a level of risk we will each tolerate and so as the 
environment changes we change our behaviour to remain broadly at the same level of 
risk, if we can. This, of course, is an empirical claim, and I don’t know what the 
current state of evidence is. But it should certainly make regulators pause for thought. 
 
To return to the main line, we have considered two ‘ideal type cases’ – individualism 
and paternalism. I now want to introduce a third case, perhaps of more theoretical 
than practical interest. This is a case where one party makes the decision and takes the 
risk of loss while another gains any benefit. If the last case was called ‘paternalism’, 
we might coin a new term, ‘maternalism’ for this, for it resembles the sacrificing 
behaviour often taken by a mother for her children (although of course just as 
paternalism is not restricted to fathers, maternalism is not restricted to mothers). 
Outside the domestic sphere, arguably another case is where a government offers 
trade guarantees, underwriting any possible loss. Indeed the behaviour of any 
guarantor may well fall into this category. 
 
Broadly maternalism seems ethically untroubling, but the next case, ‘externalities’ is 
rather different. Here the party that stands to benefit also makes the decision about 
whether the risk is run, but others bear the cost. For obvious reasons this is a very 
dangerous situation, for if one reaps only the positive, and not the negative, 
consequences of risk it encourages reckless or self-serving risk-taking. Such situations 
should ring alarm bells. And, indeed, some analyses of the recent financial crisis can 
be seen as pointing exactly to this structure. Somehow individuals working in banks 
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and other financial institutions managed to place themselves in a situation where they 
could reap the benefits from very risky behaviour, but, at least in many cases, they 
were personally insulated against many of the most severe costs. This same structure 
is the bugbear of the insurance industry, where it is known as ‘moral hazard’. If 
people are protected against loss, they have far less reason to avoid risky behaviour, 
especially if that behaviour benefits them in some ways. Consequently the insurance 
industry has devised mechanisms that spread at least part of the loss to those who can 
control whether the risk is taken, to try to make them more cautious: this, of course, is 
the role of a no claims bonus, or excess on a policy. In economic terms, this is the 
science of ‘incentive compatibility’, ensuring that people have individual incentives to 
do the socially right thing; an issue, incidentally, now spreading into health policy. 
 
The case of externalities, where the decision maker can potentially benefit from the 
decision with any possible losses falling on others, comes up in unexpected places. It 
can arise in the negative case too, where the decision maker refuses to allow a risk, or 
risks of a certain category, to take place because he or she benefits from the current 
situation. Take one of the early decisions concerning road safety; the passing of the 
Locomotives Act, also known as the red flag act, in 1865. This set a speed limit of 
2mph in town (4mph in the countryside) for any motorized vehicle, and required a 
crew of three people, including one walking 60 yards ahead waving a red flag, so as 
not to frighten the horses. This was a very sensible policy for huge agricultural 
vehicles on the roads, but it applied to all motor vehicles, however small or light. In 
1878 a new act was passed, which removed the need for the red flag, but not the man 
walking ahead of the vehicle. The basic provisions remained in force until 1896, when 
a class of vehicles weighing less than 3 tons were exempted and subjected to a speed 
limit of 12 mph. 
 
According to one writer, this very conservative approach to safety was highly 
detrimental to the development of the motor industry in Britain, whereas France, with 
much lighter regulation, forged ahead. He writes: 
 
Why had Victorian Britain been so hostile to the motor car? Why did 
legislation so deliberately handicap the use of horseless carriages of the road? 
Was it, as has been suggested, that Britain was a nation of horse lovers that 
9 
could not bear to see that ‘noble’ animal supplanted? It was not. … The real 
reason for keeping the self-propelled vehicle at bay was that a very large and 
influential number of the people’s representatives in Parliament had taken the 
trouble to acquire financial interests in the railways … Members of both 
Houses waded wallet-deep in [this very lucrative business]. Road transport 
could have ruined their fortunes.
8
 
 
 
If this allegation is correct then in this case, and in others, not only do the decision 
makers have a stake in the decision going one way rather than another, they may well 
have done as much as they could to disguise or hide that fact. Very superficially, 
hiding the benefits is perplexing if cost-benefit analysis is to be our method of 
deciding whether to go ahead. After all the more benefits there are, the more likely it 
is that they will outweigh the costs. But there are two very important responses to this. 
First, it seems we are not indifferent to how the costs and benefits are distributed. 
Second, if a decision maker will benefit from a decision we are much less likely to 
trust them to have come to a full appreciation of the costs, for they have reason not to 
be objective or impartial. Informed risk decision-making requires a risk analysis. And 
where the decision maker has a stake in the outcome – whether positive or negative – 
we have reason to distrust their analysis and therefore reasons to want the roles 
separated. The distorting effect of self-interest makes us suspect that something will 
go wrong in cases where the decision maker has a one-sided interest in the outcome. 
This all seems very obvious. Yet its application to the regulation of risk is far from 
straightforward. 
 
Why is that? The obvious response to an ‘externalities’ case where the decision-
maker reaps benefits but not costs is two-fold: supervise the decision maker with 
another party – a regulator - who has no stake in the decision, and make the party who 
benefits also share in any potential risk or loss. By these means we reduce the danger 
by reducing decision making power and changing the incentives for action. But note 
that doing this is to introduce an element of paternalism into the situation. And we 
have already observed that, at least in some cases, paternalism can be ineffective as a 
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way of obtaining desired outcomes. Adams used the notion of a ‘risk thermostat` to 
illustrate the idea that each of us is prepared to live with a certain level of risk in our 
lives and will adjust our behaviour according. If that is right, we need to ask whether 
there is also a ‘selfishness thermostat’ that works in the same way. As regulators 
change the environment so that some types of self-seeking, exploitative behaviour 
become impossible or more difficult, then the self-seeking may well look for other 
ways – weaknesses in regulation elsewhere – that will allow them to pursue their self-
interest at the risk of others and not themselves.  
 
As an example, anyone who has employed an electrician lately in the UK may have 
noticed that the price has risen above what it was a few years ago. Why? In 2004 the 
daughter of then MP Jenny Tonge was electrocuted, and very sadly died, as a result of 
poor wiring in her kitchen. As a result the government introduced regulations that 
requires anyone conducting electrical work to have obtained a safety certificate. An 
electrician I spoke to about this claimed that all the respectable, high quality, 
electricians have obtained the qualification, at extra expense that they pass on to the 
customer, while those electricians who were prepared to do shoddy and dangerous 
work are also prepared to lie to customers about having the certificate. His claim was 
that the regulation has made high quality work more expensive for customers and has 
made the world more dangerous by making unsafe electricians more economically 
competitive. The main beneficiaries, he claimed, are those contracted to supply 
training courses. He may be wrong about this, but it is a position we need to take 
seriously. 
 
Outside the risk context the ‘selfishness thermostat’ is seen most commonly in 
financial affairs, such as taxation. As one loophole is closed, lawyers and accountants 
go back to look for others. In the current context several commentators have said that 
attempting to prevent future financial crises by regulation is impossible; traders will 
find other situations in which they can generate gains for themselves by placing the 
greater risk on others who are unaware of the risks they are running. I don’t know if 
this is correct, but it is certainly a danger, and a challenge for regulators. In general 
those who write regulations have much less personally at stake than those who are 
bound by them, and so it is an uneven struggle from the start. In effect those who try 
to find ways round regulations are looking to continue to operate at a level of 
11 
selfishness with which they are comfortable. The challenge for regulators is to make 
this impossible. 
 
 
Finally, we must discuss cases where the three roles are distributed among three 
parties.  Common cases would be where a decision is made by government to allow 
one party to proceed with a course of action which has risks, but no benefits, for 
another. This we could call ‘adjudication’, and this case completes our taxonomy of 
pure cases, as illustrated in the table, although as we have seen there will also be 
hybrid or impure cases: 
 
 
  Party suffering 
cost 
Party enjoying 
benefit 
Party making 
decision 
1 Individualism A A A 
2 Paternalism A A B 
3 Maternalism A B A 
4  Externalities A B B 
5 Adjudication A B C 
 
 
 
A simple example of adjudication would be your local government granting someone 
else planning permission to build on the plot next to your house. Here you bear risk 
and do not gain, another party stands to gain, and a third party makes the decision (at 
least in part). Once again such cases are not pure as the party that hopes to benefit 
does bear some risk, but the salient point is that the person living next door to the 
building site bears risk of uncompensated loss, through noise and disruption and 
perhaps subsequent reduced enjoyment of their own property, and benefits directly 
little if at all, and has very limited say in this decision. With this description, it may be 
hard to see why such practices are allowed.  
 
12 
The obvious answer, of course, is that it forms part of a pattern of behaviour from 
which we all can reasonably expect to benefit over time, even if in particular cases we 
might lose out. It is against such a background that cost-benefit analysis comes into its 
own. While it is easy to point out the apparent injustice of a decision that benefits 
some at the cost of another, if this is part of a larger pattern by which we all 
sometimes benefit and all sometimes lose, then, under the right circumstances we can 
all be better off when cost-benefit analysis is used and projects are allowed whenever 
their benefits outweigh costs. However, these conditions are rather restrictive. In one 
type of case in which the cost-benefit approach seems unobjectionable, three 
conditions need to be met. First, we need to be assured that this is a situation of a type 
that is very likely to re-occur, as in the case of planning permission. For otherwise it 
cannot be claimed that the situation in question falls into part of a pattern from which 
all benefit over time. Second, in this ongoing series everyone must have the chance of 
being a winner in some decisions as well as a loser in others, and the distribution of 
chances must be fair. For if one party frequently loses and the other frequently wins 
then it can no longer be said that we are all better off as a result of the practice. 
Finally, normally it is important that the possible loss is limited. For if the risk is too 
great then those who lose who will not be around to reap the benefits next time round. 
Ideally, then, this final condition is read to exclude very high costs, such as extreme 
financial loss or death; anything that puts you out of the game.
9
 
 
However this last condition needs to be modified in the case of decisions involving 
risk, for the cost-benefit analysis as used in safety policy clearly does trade-off risks 
of death. Here we need to return to the problem we started with: isn’t one death too 
many? How can we put a price on life? The accepted position now within the risk 
literature is that this is really the wrong the way to think about the issue. When we 
introduce a safety improvement we are reducing risk for everyone. We are not saving 
the life of any identified person but making the world a little bit safer for a wide 
number of people. Of course the consequence of this is that fewer people will die, but 
what we are valuing is not life but the aggregated risk reduction for many people. 
Seeing it this way makes finding a financial value far less problematic. For spending 
money on safety improvements, such as a better cycle helmet, is an ordinary part of 
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life. Talking about the ‘value of life’ is an awkward shorthand for the aggregated 
value of many small risk reductions. Hence in putting a financial value of safety we 
are not valuing life. This should make us more comfortable with a cost-benefit 
analysis.
10
 
 
Routine and Non-Routine Risks 
 
But it does not at all follow from what has been said that we need to accept all levels 
of risk, provided that there are compensating benefits. For a situation to be fall within 
the acceptable ‘routine’ range the risks will need to be below a certain magnitude. 
This, as it happens, fits with current safety policy in the UK. In its guidance 
document, Reducing Risk, Protecting People, the Health and Safety Executive 
suggests that risks can be thought to fall into three categories; those so trivial as not to 
need regulation; those so serious as to be avoided other than in the most exceptional 
circumstances; and those falling in a middle band, which are to be reduced to ‘as low 
as reasonably practicable’.11 ‘Reasonably’ is of course the key word. 
 
For this middle band cost-benefit analysis seems appropriate, as long as the situation 
can be seen as one of a kind that falls into a pattern of ‘routine’ cases, which is to say 
that those who are exposed to higher risk in one case will benefit from other people’s 
exposure in other cases, and that it turns out broadly fair over time. 
 
What would make the situation ‘non-routine’? The Health and Safety Executive, 
following work in the psychology of risk, suggest that some situations engage a 
higher level of concern. These include situations which: 
 
They often give rise to risks which could cause multiple fatalities; where it is 
difficult for people to estimate intuitively the actual threat; where exposure 
involves vulnerable groups, eg children; where the risks and beneﬁts tend to be 
unevenly distributed – for example between groups of people with the result 
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that some people bear more of the risks and others less, or through time so that 
less risk may be borne now and more by some future generation.
12
 
 
Just before this passage the document suggests ‘typical examples relate to nuclear 
power generation, railway travel, or the genetic modiﬁcation of organisms.’ 
 
Safety experts from the railway industry were not happy that railway travel was put 
alongside nuclear power and GM crops here, bearing in mind that cases of transport 
safety are rather mundane and well-known. The only listed feature that clearly singles 
them out is the possibility of ‘multiple fatality’ incidents. Yet for the last 50 years 
there probably has not been a week in which more people in the UK died in rail 
accidents than in road accidents. 
 
Nevertheless, it is true that until just a few years ago – I mean three or four – the 
railways had a terrible reputation for safety, stirred up by the trade unions who wanted 
to associate privatization with poor safety and thereby make the case for re-
nationalisation, and the quality Sunday newspapers, who found that multi-page semi-
scientific analyses of train crashes, with pictures and diagrams, were an excellent way 
of selling newspapers. But what made railways problematic at the time was not the 
nature of the risk, but the suspicion that there was something about safety decision 
making that was going badly wrong. The mantra ‘profits before safety’ was rolled out 
again and again in criticism of the industry. On one level this was a peculiar 
accusation as one of the many perplexing features of privatization was that the 
taxpayer remained liable for the cost of safety improvements.  Yet on a smaller scale 
the accusation of ‘profits before safety’ had some purchase, when what was meant 
was that pursuit of bonuses on maintenance contracts and avoidance of penalties on 
late running led individuals to breach official policy. 
  
Here we see again that we become very concerned when we believe that those who 
make a decision to permit a risk have a financial interest – a vested interest – in the 
risk being taken, but where any losses consequent on the decision will fall on others. 
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We suspect that the decision maker will conduct a faulty risk analysis and base their 
decision on a distorted account of the evidence, for their own profit.  
 
Arguably, then, railway safety became ‘non-routine’ for a while not because of the 
nature of the risk, but because of suspicions about vested interests in the micro-risk 
management process. The other two cases mentioned by the Health and Safety 
Executive as exceptional - nuclear power and genetically modified organisms – are 
very different in that they present risks that are very hard to quantify and, on some 
scenarios, could be catastrophic. This puts us in a position of what economists call 
‘decision under uncertainty’ rather than decision under risk, where probabilities and 
the nature of outcomes are unknown. In such cases cost-benefit analysis is no help. 
We cannot say whether or not the benefits outweigh the costs if we don’t know what 
the costs are. 
 
Many people appear to believe that in such cases it is possible to appeal to ‘the 
precautionary principle’ to deal with such cases. What is this famous principle? There 
are several versions of it, although this is the version quoted by the Health and Safety 
Executive, in the version provided by the United Nations Conference on the  
Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992. ‘Where there are threats of serious 
or irreversible environmental damage, lack of full scientiﬁc certainty shall not be used 
as a reason for postponing cost effective measures to prevent degradation.’13  
 
So this is not exactly a principle, but a warning that lack of full scientific certainty is 
not a good reason for non-action. Which is very sensible as ‘full scientific certainty’ is 
a very high barrier. The precautionary principle, or approach, is often interpreted as 
suggesting that we should be very cautious in cases of uncertainty, or where there is a 
risk. But how cautious? Much appears to depend on how great the benefits are in 
comparison to apparently safer ways of doing things. But once again we need to 
distinguish the risk management process from the nature of the risks to which we 
might be exposed. Is there a hidden agenda, where some benefits and some costs are 
hidden, in order to make the decision look much more routine and straightforward 
than it might really be? Here we might compare nuclear power and GM crops. As far 
                                                 
13
 Health and Safety Executive, ibid p. 29. 
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as I know, now that the debate over nuclear power has matured over the decades, and 
in contrast to the early years of the debate, there is little suspicion that the ordinary 
person is only being offered part of the picture by the decision makers. We now know 
about the possibilities of radiation leaks, catastrophic failure and the problems of 
nuclear waste. We also know that private companies will make profits from nuclear 
power, but we also know about limited supplies of, and other problems with, fossil 
fuels. 
 
In the case of the debate about GM crops, however, there was also great suspicion 
about the decision making process in that it became widely believed that those 
advocating the introduction of such crops were hiding salient facts. There were 
various concerns about intellectual property rights that would be asserted over seeds, 
and that farmers in the developing world would become trapped into long-term 
contracts, which would lead to long-term dependence and exploitation with little if 
any benefit, despite the claims of advocates of GM that it provided the best route to 
end world hunger. Consequently the issue was doubly mired: first, it was very unclear 
what the risks were; second, those in the best position to estimate the effects had 
every reason to mislead. Against this background it is not surprising that the idea of 
introducing GM crops received a hostile reception. Those who wanted to move the 
debate on to questions of ‘sound science’ began to look like, in Karl Marx’s 
memorable phrase about academic economists, ‘hired prize fighters for capitalism’. 
 
What, then, can we conclude? I think it is clear that over a wide range of routine cases 
cost benefit analysis is acceptable in the sense that over time it is likely to make us all 
better off. In effect we can see isolated cases of risk as part of a larger practice of risk 
taking in which we all benefit, we all face costs, and we are all part of the decision 
making process about acceptable levels of risk through the democratic process. In 
effect, then, we could call this a form of ‘collective individualism’, in which we all 
collectively occupy all three roles in the risk situation. 
 
From this it follows that having a more restrictive attitude to risk is likely to make us 
all worse off in the sense of forsaking valuable activity. But it does not follow that 
cost benefit analysis is always acceptable. I’ve here introduced two types of non-
routine cases. Sometimes they are non-routine because of the nature of the risk, 
17 
especially where the potential costs are very hard to estimate, but possibly very 
substantial. But sometimes cases are non-routine because of the way the risk is 
managed. The particular danger case is where the decision maker stands to gain if 
things go well, and others lose if things go badly. This is especially dangerous if the 
decision maker is not fully open about the possible benefits, which will lead to 
reasonable suspicion that there has not been a full declaration of the possible costs. 
 
What makes these situations non-routine is very different and hence quite different 
responses are needed. Where the danger arises because of management of risk, we 
need to think about how to take power away from those who benefit from the risk and 
increase the power of those who may lose, and this is something we may attempt 
through regulation. But in creating any regulations we need to pay attention to John 
Adams’ risk thermostat and also consider whether an analogous selfishness 
thermostat exists, for if we ignore such considerations we could end up creating 
regulation which is both expensive and pointless. 
 
Where the situation is one where it is non-routine because of the nature of the risk, as 
in nuclear power, it is unlikely that any simple formula that can be applied. 
Unfortunately the precautionary principle takes us only a very little distance, and to 
date nothing else has been supplied, as far as I know. It has to be left to judgement 
and given that the costs and benefits fall on us all there is no substitute for a wide 
political debate, including lengthy articles with diagrams in the Sunday newspapers.  
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